FOREIGN. ..RELATIONS, Y-19 50., 0OLUME I


could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow -could, how-
ever, so, reduce the capabilities, of the U.S.S.R. to supply and equip
its military organization and its civilian,- population as to give the
UnItecd States theprospect of developing a generalmilitary superiority
in a war of long duration.
  2. As the atomiccapability of the U.S.S.R. increases, it will have
an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and
thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out
an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the
near future the U.S.S.R. will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs
and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with
its present inadequate air defense could be relied upon as an advance
base from which a major portion of the U.S. attack could be launched.
  It is estimated that, within the next four years, the U.S.S.R. will
attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United
States provided- it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that
the -blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have
progra    ed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United
States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.
  Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among
other, measuresgreatly increased air warning systems, air defenses,
and vigorous' de'velopment-and implementation of a civilian defense
program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military
defens systems.
  In time he atomic capability of the U.S.S.R.'can be expected to
grow to apoint-where, given surprise and no more effective opposition
than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial
attack cannot be excluded.
   3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative
and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron
curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary
security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this
advantage.
  4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably
adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack
against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates
that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on
us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation
decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly
and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such
a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an
incitement to war.
   5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weap-
ons -is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any US. retalia-


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