NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


661.00/2-850C
Study Prepared by the Director of1the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)'

                              [Extract]
SECRET                             [WASMNGTON,] February 8, '1950.
                       RECENT SOVIET MOVES
                            CONCLUSIONS.
  I. In seeking to interpret Soviet tactics, it is always useful to remind
ourselves that during the course of the war, the Kremlin cncluded
that the US would emerge as the citadel of the non.Soviet world and
therefore the primary enemy against which the USSR would of neces-
sity have to wage a life-and-death struggle. Stalin'selection speech of
1946 2 was an open declaration of hostility and since that time the
USSR has given every sign that it neither intends to abandon the
Struggle, other than on its own terms, nor pause in its prosecution. In
the choice of tactics, the USSR has shown a willingness to employ
at any given moment any maneuver or weapon which holds promise
of success. For this reason there appears no reason to assume that the
USSR will in the future necessarily make a sharp distinction between
"military aggression" and measures short of military aggression,
In
its decisions, it is.guided only by considerations of expediency. As the
USSR has already committed itself to the defeat of the US, Soviet
policy is guided by the simple consideration of weakening the world
power position of the US. This approach, on the one hand, holds out
for the USSR the possibility that it can achieve success over the US
without ever resorting, to an all-out military assault. On the other
hand, it leaves open the possibility of a quick Soviet decision to resort
to military action, locally or generally,
  II. In the aggregate, recent Soviet moves reflect not only a mount-
ing militancy but suggest a boldness that is essentially new-and
borders on recklessness, particularly since in the present international
situation great stakes are involved in any USSR move, and any move
directly or indirectly affects the US and risks US counter action.
Nothing about the moves indicates that Moscow is preparing to launch
in the near future an all-out military attack on the West. They do.

  In accordance with the instructions delivered by Under Secretary Webb at
the
Secretaxry of State's meeting of February 9, -this paper was distributed
to the
principal officers of the Department (ISecretary's Daily Meetings: Lot 58D609).
  Stalin's election s~peech of February 9, 1946, is analyzed in telegram
408 from
Moscow, February 12, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, pp. 694-696,


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