FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


interrelated. For example, there was some worry that if we had a
plan for the control of atomic energy approved by the General As-
sembly, we 'would have then had to come up quickly with a plan for
the control of conventional armaments before we could surrender our
atomic weapons.
  Mr. Nash indicated that at the last General Assembly, we had
started to lay the groundwork for the statement in the President's
speech by indicating that the time was coming when the two fields
had to be brought together and integrated into one overall plan, even
though different systems of control would be required. Since that
time, the Commission on Conventional Armaments had made progress,
and we were now prepared .to say that a system of safeguards could
be. worked out so that we could carry forward on the disarmament
plan. It had therefore been concluded that the time was ripe to sug-
gest the 'ppropriaiteness of bringing the two commissions together,
and the President had made the suggestion in his speech. This state-
ment recognized the fact that disarmament is a unit, that it must be
universal, and -that it must be surrounded by adequate safeguards.
The President advanced his idea simply as a suggestion but did not
make a specific proposal in order to see what the consensus among
other members of the United Nations would be. His suggestion had
aroused some interest. Australia had actually gone so far as to pre-
pare a resolution. However, we had discouraged them from submitting
it at once on the grounds that it was better to get general views
first. Syri a, India, Canada, Belgium, France and South Africa had
expressed real interest in -the suggestion, while the British and Nor-
wegians had had rather a negative reaction. Our present position
was more to seek the views of other members on our idea than any-
thing more concrete. We did not now intend to submit a specific
proposal in this Assembly.
   Mr. Nash noted that the President's suggestion had given rise to
 some confusion, including the'question whether a change in United
 States atomic energy policy was involved. In illustration of this fact,
 he referred to a conversation which he had had with a Belgian delel-
 gate. This- individual had iasked him whether we were coming to the
 view that inspection alone was sufficientlfor atomic energy control. Mr.
 Nash said that he had replied in the negative, that the suggestion
 did not indicate any change in our position that the best plan was
 the plan already approved by the United Nations. The Belgian had
 also asked whether the President's Suggestion indicated an intention
 on our part to propose a swap between the two fields. He had re-
 sponded that that was hardly possible. In the third placee, the Bel-
 gian had inquired whether we regarded the distinction between the


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