NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY                   355
Allied troops are present-where we possess military strength in any
way comparable to that which was available in Japan for use in Korea.
  6. The question, therefore, arises as to what we as the United States
Government can do. Our view is that we must not attempt to build
up United States military power to defend all these areas where the
Soviets in one guise or another might attack. We would badly dissi-
pate our strength if we did so. What then remains to us? Here are
some of the alternatives:
  a. There might be a declaration by the President that we will not
permit any further expansion by the Soviets or their satellites in these
so-called "soft" areas. This seems to us to be an unsatisfactory
step.
In the first place, it is easy to get around by the coup d'etat method
(viz. Czechoslovakia) : in the second place, it commits the United
States to take on the Russians or their satellites if our challenge is met.
  b. Another alternative might be to recommend to the United
Nations-probably the Security Council-that it issue such a state-
ment, warning the Soviets that a move in these areas would be re-
garded as an act of war and that the United Nations would call upon
all member states to resist it with armed forces. This, too, seems to us
to be unsatisfactory. It is dubious that we could count on all the other
nations to go along with the United States at this point and if the
Soviets use the satellitic or coup d' tat method, there is doubt whether
there would be general agreement among all the other nations that
this was in fact Soviet aggression. For these reasons, the Joint Secre-
taries cannot convince themselves that this way of handling the situa-
tion would be satisfactory.
  c. We do believe, however, that there is one thing that could be done
by the United Nations, and that is this: The United Nations on the
motion of, say, the United States could take cognizance of the fact
that the Korean venture demonstrates that the Soviets have developed
a new pattern in the use of force through their satellites. The United
States statement could then go on to recommend to the Security Coun-
cil that possibly the best way of defending specific areas from aggres-
sion by the Soviets or their satellites would be to establish a United
Nations force in each country that might appeal for such protection
under Article 35 of the UN Charter, forces which would be very small
in number, composed of troops from various United Nations coun-
tries, including America, and which would be the counterpart of the
thin line of khaki which runs across the dividing line between Eastern
and Western Germany and which to date has been such a formidable
barrier to the Soviet aggression. If such a force were in existence it
would serve notice in the most effective way upon the Soviets that
any crossing of these particular borders would bring down upon the
Soviets all the strength of the nations whose forces were overrun and,
indeed, probably most of the strength of the free world. This proposal,
however, raises certain other questions, particularly if the Soviets
should return to active participation in the United Nations. There is
a serious question that the United Nations with the Soviets participat-
ing would create a United Nations force in view of the probability of
Soviet veto. Alternatively, in the event that Soviet veto power is not
used, it probably would be impossible to create a force without Soviet