-NATTIONAL. :SECURITY ,POLICY2


only their minds but their hearts. what we need to.do is:to makeý
the
"cold war" a "warm war"'by-infusing int it ideological
principles
to give it meaning. I realize that this idea is not ignored in these
papers; in fact, there are several excellent ppassages on the-subject
n the "StUdy". The ."Draft", however, is regarded as-
deficient in this
respect and I feel might be revised to advantage.
   I would also suggest that in considering teli suggested course of
 action, we should place greater emphasis on friendly countries becom-
 ing real partners in building up the free .world. Their limitations are
 obvious but there is also' danger of animaginative limitation on our
 part in exploring every available step Which our friends as well as we
 might take.-,
 My general thought in making the foregoing observations is that
 what we are really up against is a conflict of basicconcepts of which
 the present and prospective power threat to our security is a product.
 Granted thatwe must,'of course,-avoid the danger of a shift in the
 balance- of power in favor of the U,S.S.R., it is.obvious that at the
 same time we have a tremendous problem of making sure that our
 self-confidence, courage and steadfastness are commensurately strong.
 We must work atthat too..
   -[Here follow comments on specific points in the Draft Report .and
the Staff Study.]
   I should like to say in conclusion that I amnin basic agreement with
both the papers and that such suggestions as I have ventured to make
have been with reference, to .-emphasis and detail. I might add that,
although the "Draft"-and ,the."Study"' are basicallysimilar,
I found
the pr~sentation in -he "Study" more forceful.


    PoiyPannhingStaff Files
Memorandum by, Mr.,-Charles F..      i  to t       torOf 'the Polcy-
                      Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET.G [WASHITON,] April 5, 1950;
Subject: Draft Steat-Defense Staff Study Pursuant to the Presi-
     dent's Directive of January 31,1950.2
  There can be no question of the absolute necessity in the present world;
situation of a strong and adequate U.,S. defense posi.tion., Therefore, the
purpose ,and --the general conclusions reached by thisstudy are, in my

  'Bohlen, Minister in Paris, returned to Wrashington in late March- to par.;
ticipate in the preparation of the State-Defense staff study. A former Counselor
of the Department (1947-1949), Bohlen possessed extensive experience in Soviet
4ffairs including.several long-assignments in Moscow between 1934, and, 1946.
  SThe documents under reference are described inUnder SecretarY.Webb'sa
memorandum of March 30 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto, p. 210.


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