FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


program at the present rate, however, it would be many years before
a test of a thermonuclear weapon would be possible.
  The question presented is whether the United States should under-
take at this time an accelerated program to determine the feasibility
of a thermonuclear weapon, should continue its research at the present
rate, or should place a moratorium on further work in this field.
  3. An all-out effort leading to both a feasibility test and quantity
production of "supers" would seriously impair the efficiency and
output of the fission bomb program, but there appear to be no
advocates for this type of effort. Technical studies of the Atomic
Energy Commission indicate that an accelerated research and develop-
ment program to test the feasibility of such a weapon (as distinguished
from a quantity production program) would require a minimum time
of three years; that with such a target date other weapon develop-
ments now under way, principally lighter and smaller weapons aimed
at improved deliverability.., could probably still be carried out,
but not with the care and refinement originally planned; that this
probable decrease in refinement would not be sufficiently important to
serve as a deterrent to an accelerated effort on thermonuclear research
and development (Appendix B) .3 The important consideration from
a military point of view appears to be that the most advantageous
rate and scale of effort would be such as to produce a weapon for
testing as soon as possible without significant impairment to the
quantity output of fission weapons as scheduled (Appendix C).
  4. In the present state of knowledge, it appears that there is at least
a 50-50 chance that a thermonuclear weapon will be feasible, but this
cannot be determined except by actual test (Appendix B, par. 1 and
par. 17).
  5. It is estimated on the basis of technical studies made by the
.Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense that
an accelerated program, including ordnance and carrier development,
is within the capabilities of the United States ,from the point of view
of money, materials, and industrial effort.
   6. Knowledge as to whether the thermonuclear bomb is or is not
feasible and knowledge as to its potentialities and limitations, if
feasible, are of-importance to 'military planning and foreign policy
planning (see Appendix C). It should be recognized, however, that the
failure of any given test may not conclusively demonstrate that other
methods might not be feasible.
   7. It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a

   'Appendix B, a staff study prepared by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
 is not printed. The study discussed the requirements for and feasibility
of
 construction of the hydrogen bomb, as well as the characteristic of the
weapon.


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