WESTERN HEMISPHERE -DEFENSE


aid for six countries, limited aid for sixteen other countries, and token
aid for thirty-seven more can result, in terms of granted requests, in
tremendous commitments." The Joint Chiefs emphasized that the most
careful consideration must be given to our national financial and in-
dustrial limitations and our own military requirements before specific
decisions are made. They pointed out that limited military aid may
well prove difficult to limit once it has been begun and that token aid,
by definition, bears to the recipient the implication of more to come;
and that aid spread too thin may not be adequate anywhere, whereas
concentrated aid where it may best serve the ultimate objective of our
own security may be all or even more than we can provide.
   Experience with the interim arms program in Latin America has
 demonstrated that it is almost impossible to avoid costly and disturb-
 ing national rivalries in furnishing arms to the Latin American na-
 tions. If, as stated in paragraph 16 of NSC/56, "it devolves upon the
 United States to find ways and means to enable Latin American gov-
 ernments to procure arms to the extent necessary to insure their con-
 tinued interest and cooperation", we would undertake a commitment
 of unpredictable proportions. Complete acceptance and implementa-
 tion of a hemisphere military plan on the basis of standardization
 would face us with either of two unacceptable alternatives. The United
 States would have to dictate the size and equipment of Latin Ameri-
 can armed forces in order to protect itself from impossible demands,
 or the United States would have to accept the requests of the Latin
 American nations for the arms and equipment they think they need.
 In the first alternative, we would justly be accused of flagrant inter-
 vention in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. The
 United States cannot dictate to the Latin American countries in a
 matter so closely related to sovereign independence as that of national
 defense. In the second alternative, the Latin American countries
 naturally would purchase non-American arms and equipment, and so
 defeat the standardization plan, unless the United States were pre-
 pared to meet their requests.
 TYPE OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS BEST FITTED TO
   MEET THE NEEDS OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS
   OF THE UNITED STATES
   The nature of the threat to Latin America in the event of war is an
:Important factor in the determination of the type and strength of
Latin American military establishments best suited for hemisphere
-defense and the security interests of the United States.
   Paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC/56 mention disturbances in Colombia
:and Bolivia and the failure to maintain internal order. It is believed
that such riots and armed uprisings are political and police problems


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