.NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY2


in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are
continually at'the verge of appearing and being alternately irresolute
and desperate; yet itt is the cold war which we must Win, because
both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the
first priority.
  The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, cannot be ac-
complished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter
IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is only the first
of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential
allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimida-
tion drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet
domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon West-
ern Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.
  But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of
sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people.
They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have
come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more im-
portant than that they fully understand thereasons for this. The
risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation
of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures
which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At
any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our
fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a gen-
eral war, or in testing us, may go too far. These are risks we will invite
by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we
seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated
from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may
make or 'assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No
people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by
not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove in-
offensive to their enemies.
                     VIII. ATOMIC AR31AAMENTS 9
A. Mlilitary Evalaat~ion o f U.S. antd U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities.
  1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both
numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively
utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of
the U.S.S.R. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in
the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would
cause the U.S.S.R. to sue for terms or present [prevent] Soviet forces
from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as

  'For documentation on United States policy regarding regulation of arma-
menlts, including international control of atomic energy, see pp. 1 if. For
docu-
mentation on other aspects of U.S. atomic energy policy, see ,pp. 493 ft.


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