(2) The next possibility of Chinese Communist action, in order
of likelihood, lies in further Communist.action against Chinese
islands under Nationalist control. While the Chinese Communists —
are desperately anxious to get control of Formosa (including the
Pescadores), and have announced their intention to do so regard-
less of our decisions, it is regarded as unlikely that they would
accept the risks involved in an all-out attack at this juncture. They
~ -may move against other islands held by the Nationalists, namely,
- the Lintin and Lema Islands off Canton, Kinmen ( Quemoy) Is-
, land off Amoy, Matsu Island off Foochow, and Tachen Islands off
Chenkiang Province = |_|. oe —
n the event that islands now under Chinese Nationalist con-
trol, other than Formosa. and the Pescadores, should. be attacked _
by the Chinese Communists, we would not assume the responsi-
bility for defending them, but we should also not forbid the
Nationalists to defend them and should not stand in the way of
their supporting such operations from Formosa, provided that

 

_ NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

 
 
 

_. such action did not interfere with the execution of the present

mission of our forces in the vicinity. (The foregoing is highly
tentative pending further military consideration now under way.)

(3) The third strong possibility for Chinese Communist action
in the near future is with respect to Hong Kong and Macao. Com-
munist control over Macao would be of no great importance.
Although it is a Portuguese possession, the operation of the
Atlantic Pact does not extend to it. The position we should take
in the United Nations in case of Communist seizure is one which
will be given further study in the Department of State. a

A military attack on Hong Kong is not likely in present circum-
stances. If it were to occur, contrary to expectations, we would
approve of UN action favorable to the British. We should respond
to British requests, if any, for support in the United Nations, for
relief assistance in the form of food and other supplies, for pro-
vision of assistance in merchant shipping for supplies or evacua-
tion, and should give them such military assistance as was possible
in the light of our own military commitments and capabilities at

that time.

The probability is that a strong effort will be made by means
of subversion, sabotage, and civil disorder to make life untenable
for the British in Hong Kong, and there will be little that we can
do with relation to such efforts. If these circumstances should
assume serious dimensions our principal political concern should
be to see that the British accept and take the primary

responsibility.

(4) A Communist acquisition of control over Tibet in the fairly
near future is to be expected. Here, again, our principal political
concern is to make sure that U.S. prestige is not impaired; no
immediate military implications are involved. |
_ (5) Although intelligence data now available is insufficient to —
indicate clearly the likelihood of Chinese Communist military
moves against Indochina or Burma in the near future, such moves
are both possible and logical. |

In the event such moves are made, the United States should act
according to existing policy determinations and should provide