330            FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

assistance to Western Europe. Mr. Lanphier again-raised the possi-
bility of a Russian attack on the U.S. Mr. Lay said he was worried
because the Soviet reply referred to at the beginning of the meeting
was just the kind of peaceful reply the Russians would make if they
were planning an attack on us. Mr. Kennan said he did not wish to
discount the possibility of a Soviet attack on the U.S., but he thought
the Soviet intention of exploiting the Asiatic satellites against us
was more probable because there was no risk involved for the USSR.
Mr. Lay said that if the Korean situation went wrong for the Russians,
they must realize how difficult it would be for them to reach their
objectives without military action against us. Mr. Kennan asked what
military action the Soviets would most likely take in case they were
ready for World War III. General Lindsay said the Russians would
deliver the greatest possible initial attack within their capabilities
against critical industrial targets in the U.S. Simultaneously they
would attack Western Europe and particularly bases in the U.K.
Mr. Kennan agreed that the Soviets would not start a world war
unless they felt it within their capability to cancel out North Ameri-
can industrial potential. To him this indicated that a global war now
was rather remote, since he did not believe the USSR had the capabili-
ties to attack North America successfully. He thought if the Russians
got into a world war now they would have stumbled in, and in the long
run this might be the best situation for us.
  It was agreed:
  (1): That Admiral Hillenkoetter would prepare a draft on an
estimate of the danger spots where the USSR or satellites might take

military action.
   (2) That Mr. Kennan would prepare a draft on what actions the
United States would desire to take in the event of further Soviet mili-
tary moves.
   (3) That the group would meet again at 11:00 a. m. on Friday,
June 30, 1950, in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC.5
  'No draft by Admiral Hillenkoetter on possible Soviet military action,
no
draft by Kennan on United States response, and no record of a June 30 meeting
have been found in the files of the Department of State. However, on the
30th,
Kennan transmitted a draft report titled "Possible Further Danger Points
in
Light of Korean Situation" to Ambassador Jessup and Deputy Under Secretary
Matthews. Kennan's covering memorandum read as follows:
  "There is attached a copy of a draft report on possible further danger
points
which I prepared this afternoon in the light of our discussions with the
NSC
Consultants, General Lindsay, Chief of the Strategic Planning Staff, and
Admiral Hillenkoetter. I am sorry there was not time to clear this with you,
but I have shown it to Bohlen and to the S/P Staff.
  "We will discuss the draft at the NSC tomorrow at 10:-30 a. m. If
you have
any suggestions or comments, please let me have them before then.
  "Present plans call for sending copies of the report to all of the
members of
the Council including the President, tomorrow afternoon. Prior to that stage,
there will be no final commitment of our Secretary or of the Department to
the
report, which will be the report of the special NSC group."
  A marginal notation indicates that the Kennan draft, not printed, was re-
written in the National Security Council as NSC 73 (infra). (Policy Planning
Staff Files)