FOREIGN-RELATIONS, 19500, VOLUME I


This could hardly fail to cause great-confusion, not only to people in
Europe butabove all -to members of our Congress who arebeing asked
to support the program.
   D, In general, it must be recognized that the most important reasons
why, the Russians -today so overshadow the west in conventional
weapons lie not in the scale of Soviet armaments, formidable as-this
may be, but rather in the disappearance of Germany as a factor in the
military balance between east and west, in the high cost of armaments
to the states of western Europe and North America, and above all
in the presence of Russian military forces in the very heart of Europe
by virtue of the continued occupation of Germany and Austria.3
If -the Atlantic Pact nations wish to redress the present disbalance in
the6-power of conventional armaments, as between east and west, they
must find means first and foremost to get: the. Russians out of the
center of Europe;; a more easily verifiable, controllable and effective
means of relieving tho military pressure on ,the west thaný promises
of reduction of armaments. They must also find ways of harnessing
western German skills and energies to the building of defensive
strength in the west as a whole, not in Germany alone. Finally, they
must face up-to the fact that a Russian military-potential built on so
vast a foundation of sacrifice and discipline can be effectively met
only by a western effort in which sacrifice and discipline play at least
a respectible, if-not a comparable, part. Should the west do all these
,things, the, day might come when the Russians would find incentive
for considering a real and significant reduction in conventional arma-
.ments, although ithe .chances .:of anyth-ing of this sort. being brought
about by formal international agreement of: --a multilateral nature
would -still be small..As things stand today, the Russians are not going
-to: be so obliging as-,to relieve-.the west gratuitously, through.some
agreed.reduction in-conventional armaments, of a military disparity
.in -conventional weapons which is -one of Communism's most valuable
political assets. and an important compensating asset for the reverses
suffered by Moscow to date in the Europeancold-war.
   It is impossible to say, just in-the light of the above coniderations,

 what this Government should or should not_ do about conventional
 disarmament.-But it "is possible to say that if the abolition of the
 atomic weapon must await agreement on a comprehensive program
 for reduction of conventional armaments, it may as well be dismissed
 from present consideration. And in this case, we should plainly not
 undertake today any new moves in the field.of international control.
    The same applies, of course, to a voluntary renunciation on our
 part of the: deliberate use of :the atomic Weapon. Unless we are pre-
 pared .to ccept the situation which would ensue, from the standpoint
 _ofour resultant, potenti-al in conventional weapons, we should neither
 offer -to:give up he bomb nor resolve to forego thedeliberate use of it.
 .The possibilities for. conventional disarmament are nither great
   3DocumentatiOn on United States policy with respect to Germany and on
   U.S. policy with respect to Austria is scheduled :for p ublicationin volume
IV.


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