360 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

the emergency requires U.S. military, naval, air and civilian defenses
be put on the basis of readiness to repel acts or threats of aggression
directed toward the Western Hemisphere ; (2) calls upon citizens en-
gaged in production for defense to give precedence to the needs of
the nation; (8) calls for cooperation to assure internal security ; and
(4) calls upon all “loyal citizens to place the nation’s needs fir st in
mind and in action to the end that we may mobilize and have ready
for instant defensive use all of the physical powers, all of the moral
strength and all of the material resources of this nation.” There are
also some hundred war-time statutes still in effect.

The United Nations Charter does not require the member nations
to enter into a state of war in case of aggression, but merely to take
such military action as is hecessary to “maintain or to restore inter-
national peace and security,” as is now being done in the case of the
conflict in Korea. The Charter leaves each nation free to determine
how it will carry out its-obligations under the Charter. Consequently,
it is a domestic matter whether we carry them out with or without a
declaration of war. |

The Atlantic Treaty j is in effect a defensive military alliance, but
it does not require the parties to enter into a state of war as did the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the United Nations Declaration
of 1941. It merely provides that in case of an attack on one of the
parties, the others will assist that party with appropriate action
including the use of armed force. If Russia or a Russian satellite
attacks one of the nations party to the Atlantic Treaty, our coming
to its assistance would not necessarily call for a U.S. declaration of
war. However, if there was a resultant generalization of hostilities, a
declaration almost certainly would be required.

“CONCLUSIONS —

‘1. Extensive hostilities van be carried. on by the United States
without a formal declaration of a state of war.

2. Such a declaration should be made only when required by over-
whelming National interest.

3. The National interest might require that we carry on limited
hostilities against the military forces of the Soviet Union without a
declaration. | |

RECOMMENDATION

The Secretary should discuss this matter with the President.

 

Editorial Note

At its 64th n Meeting on August 10, 1950, ‘the National Security
Council agreed in principle that the port security program proposed