FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


  The Foreign Office feels that the UK and the US Governments
should be considering the possibility of Soviet or Soviet-inspired ag-
gressive action in other places than Korea. The telegram mentioned
two factors of importance in connection with a Soviet-inspired attack:
(1) whether the USSR Representative was present in the Security
Council and thus able to veto action, (2) the degree of help the UK,
the US, and other free countries would in any case be ready and
willing to afford the country attacked. The telegram went on to say
that if such an attack occurred against a country the UK would feel
compelled to assist to the full regardless of possible consequences, the
UK should presumably give such aid under the aegis of a Security
Council resolution (as in Korea) or, if vetoed, under Article 51.
  The telegram continued that the real problem arose if there were
aggression against a country which the UK was not prepared to aid
to the full regardless of consequences (as, for example, Yugoslavia).
  The telegram went on to say that if an attack occurred against Yugo-
slavia and unless strong action was taken by the Security Council as in
the Korean case, the effect on the prestige of the United Nations might
be disastrous and the whole effect of the prompt action by the Security
Council in the Korean case irretrievably lost. It might then be said
that the Korean case was not a genuine action but merely a US opera-
tion and that the UN had "burned its fingers in Korea and was now
chary of taking similar action elsewhere".
  The telegram continued that the Foreign Office felt that the US
and the UK should consider the line the two countries should take
in such a case in the Security Council or perhaps in the UN. The two
countries might, in the light of the foregoing, feel that they should
restrain the Security Council or the General Assembly. They might
want to consider acting as a restraining influence on the Secretariat
to keep it from "running ahead" of the UN. There might be a tend-
ency on the part of the UN to regard Korea as a precedent which
must be followed whenever aggression takes place.
  After I had read the telegram the Ambassador said that he did
not, of course, expect an immediate reply since I would obviously wish
to consider this matter before discussing it in detail. He apologized
for not having copied this top secret telegram and suggested that I
make such notes as I wished, which I did.
  I told the Ambassador that I would consider this matter, discuss
it with some of my colleagues, and get in touch with him at a later
date. I told him that the only comment I would make today was to
draw his attention to the fact that the Security Council action in
Korea was taken in two resolutions. The first one on June 25 found a
breach of the peace, called on the aggressors to cease hostilities and
to withdraw to their own territory, called on the UN Commission to
observe the cease-fire and withdrawal, called on all members to give
every assistance to the UN in the execution of the resolution and not
to aid the aggressor. I pointed out that this resolution, taken within
a few hours after the news of the attack took place, could have been


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