NATIONAL SIECURITY POLICY


   Mr. Gleason noted that the, President had directed a review of
 United Statespolicy relating to the perimeter around the USSR. He
 believed this should be on an over-all rather than a'country-by-country
 basis. The purpose of this meeting was to allocate responsibility for
 preparation of.- aw paper and furnish general guidance to those who
 would prepare it,.
   Mr. Kennan understood that the President desired a simple, in-
 formal1 review of the situation which arose as a result of the attack
 on Korea, i.e., at what other points -the USSR .or ,its satellites might
 attack, and .what the United States would do in the event of such
 attack. M rir. Kennan believed a paper in the spirit of the actions of the
 last three days was wanted. He thought the chief-danger spots were
 Yugoslavia, Iranand Eastern Germany.
 Admiral Iillenkoetter agreed with :this general estimate, adding
 that-Soviet maneuvers were again taking place in Eastern Germany.
   Mr. Lay (joining the meeting) said that we might also consider
 what we could do now,.in advance of other possible Soviet attack. For
 example, strengthening the Mediterranean fleet and lifting manpower
 ceilings had been mentioned. Mr. Kennan thought this raised another
 and separate set of questions.
   Mr. Jessup said there were three main problems, which were related
 but separate.'
   (1) A)An estimateofthe danger spots where the USSR or satellites
might.takemilitary action.,
   (2) .-.What actions he 6nited States would desire tO take in the event
 of further Soviet military moves.
   (3) Whetherthe United States was in a position to take the actions
 regardedas necessary under (2).
 -.,Mr. Kennan thogght Mr. Jessup had listed the problems in order
 of priority. Mr. Matthews believed it important to consider steps to
 be taken now without awaiting further attack. i
 Mr. Kennan summarized current informal thinking in the State
 Department. If Yugoslavia were attacked there weretwo possible
 United, States positions: (1) we might regard the attack as vitally
 affecting United States interests and thus calling for United States
 military assistance, (2) we might decline to consider communist Yugo-
 slavia as on our side to an extent requiring more than limited assist-
 ance. Mr. Kennan thought a Soviet attack ion either Iran or Germany
-would mean the USSR was ready forWorld War III and we would be
obliged 'to react accordingly. He thought from observation of the
Korean situation that the USSR intended to avoid open involvement
and did not intend to launch a general war. However, two develop-


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