FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


have an incentive to use it first, and there is no discussion of thet
problems deriving from these facts.
  Mr. Nitze explained that we had discussed all of these questions iin
some of our first meetings and had come to the definite conclusionm
that before we could attempt to give any answers we had to construct-
a basic framework into which -the answers would fit.
  Dr. Oppenheimer commented that he had ,always felt that what we.
did about the A-bonmb could be an inspiration for most other con-
siderattions, to which Mr. Nitze replied that in his opinion there is a
strong interrelationship between the morale of the people and their
feeling that our type of system can provide them with a defense-
without particular regard to the type of weapons.
  Dr. Oppenheimer said that two .things stand out sharply with refer-
ence to the atomic bomb: one is terror and the other is mystery. With
regard to the first, the question iarises as to what we can do or say.
Would it be reasonable to say that we would use it only .for retaliatory
purposes. In this connection, we seen to have slipped into our present
military posture by default because obviously right now without the
atomic bomb we would have no military posture. The question then
arises whether could we build up our strength during the next five,
years, ,for example, so as to get away from complete dependence on the
atomic bomb?
  Mr. LeBaron expressed some doubt asto (a) whet her a person was
any deader if killed by an A-bomb ,than by a rifle bullet, and (b),
whether the A-bomb is any more horrible thian many other weapons,
particularly those in the biological and chemical field. Dr. Oppen-
heimer stated his belief that there was a moral difference between
killing ten people and ten million and said that the issue wlas con-
cerned primarily with the atomic bomb because itt was his understand-
ing that biological and chemical weapons were not considered effective
for offensive use.
  Mr. Nitze reiterated his concern with the relationship between
morale and the lack of defense ,against aggression. He pointed out that
to supply Western Europe alone with a reasonable amount of con-
ventional armaments might cost $40 billion and even then you would
only have around sixty divisions ,as compared to over 200 of the Soviet
Union. The thing to do was to strengthen the moral filber of the peopleý
and the draft paper which we had prepared suggested that you build
toward that objective. Dr. Oppenheimer agreed that you cannot give
up the A-bomb while you are still building toward that objective, but
pointed out thaat the Russians in five years might be able to do more
damage with atomic bombs in Western Europe than we could do to
them. Mr. Nitze recapituliated four points: (1) that the Russians'


170