WNATIONAL .SECURITY POLICY


Policy Planning Staff Files
Memoranduin of National Security Council Comsultants' Meeting,
                  Thursday, June 29, 1950, 2f p. m.

TOP SECRET                            WASHINGTON, June 29, 1950.
Subject: Situation Resulting from Hostilities in Korea
Present: Mr. Kennan           Mr.,Stalheim
          Mr. Bishop          Adm. Hillenkoetter
          "Gen. Spalding       Mr. Lay
          Gen. Lindsay1       Mr. Gleason
          Col. Shell           Mr. Boggs
          Mr. Lanphier
  Mr. Kennan said that the Soviet reply to our note regarding Korea
had been received.2 This note declared (1) that South Korea, and not
North Korea, was the aggressor, (2) that Soviet policy was one of
non-interference in the affairs of other states, and hence the USSR
could not prevent the North iKoreans from defending themselves,
and (3) that the USSR did not fail to attend the UN Security Council
meeting, because there can be no valid meeting in the absence of Com-
munist !China. Mr. Kennan said this note was reassuring in indicating
that the USSR was not directly involving itself, but it was not re-
assuring in that it showed a determination by the USSR to involve
the U.S. with the Soviet satellites, The Chinese Communist reaction
to our measures had been hostile and provocative, indicating a pos-
sible intention to attack Formosa, Mr. Kenuan said we would need
to watch the Chinese Communists very carefully.
  Mr. Kennan referred to the possibility of a gradual build-up of
naval strength supplied to the Chinese Communists by the USSR.
He said this highlighted the importance of the islands near Formosa.
His feeling was that we should communicate to Chiang Kai-shek 3
substantially as follows: Chiang's support or evacuation of these
islands is a question to be arranged with our naval commander in
the Far East. We should not take the responsibility of telling Chiang
that he cannot defend these islands, nor do we want to assume the
responsibility for defending them. Mr. Kennan also referred to the
possibility that Chiang might be overthrown at any time, and said
this raised -the question of direct U.S. military liaison With sub-
ordinate Chinese commanders.

  I Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint
  Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  2 Fortext of U.S. noteo of June 27, see vol. vii, p. 202. The Soviet reply
is quoted
  in telegram 1767 from Moscow, Juhe 29, ibid, p. 229.
  President of the Republic of China.


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