-NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY25


strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from
a major war or, in-any event, to delay materially the overrunning of
Western' Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on' the continent
against Soviet Union offensives.
  We' do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but
the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence. estimates, concurred in by
State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign
to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb
stockpile within the following ranges:
                     By mid-1950       10-20
                     By mid-1951       25-45
                     By mid-1952       45-90
                     By mid-1953       70-135
                     By mid-1954       200
This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet
activities and represents the production capabilities of known or de-
ducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could
lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might
be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of
a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union
experiences operating difficulties, §this estimate would be reduced.
There is Some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain ma-
terials essential to research on and 'development of thermonuclear
weapons.
  The Soviet :Union now has aircraft able to deliver the aomic bomb.
Our Inteigence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic
bomber. capability 'already in excess of that needed to deliver avai-
able bombs. we have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the
Soviet accuracy of delivery on target.- It is believed tthat the- Soviets
cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy: com-
parable't ours, but a planning estimate might Well place it at 40-60
percent of bombs sortied. For planning purposes, therefore, the date
the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would ,be a
critical date for the United States, for the delivery of 100 atomic
bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this
country.
  At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and
if it is assumed that it willstrike a strong surprise blow and if it is
assumed further1 that its atomic attacks will be met with no more
effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have
programmed, results of those attacks could include:
  a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western
Powers of their use as a base;
  b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of


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