NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


in Europe will by that time be so seriously undermined as to assure
satisfactory progress in the accomplishment of Soviet global objec-
tives even in the absence of general war. It suffices to point out that
the ensuing train of events might logically be expected to lead to the
break-up of the Atlantic Pact organization, the political defection
of Germany, and the eventual strategic withdrawal of the U.S. from
the European continent.
                                               GEoRGE F. KENNAN

661.00/8-1150: Telegram
  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary
                             of State

TOP SECRET                        Moscow, August 11, 1950--4 p. m.
  386. Despite the Korean conflict, plethora of subsequent rumors
and an obvious increase in intensity of the war of nerves, none of the
developments since April of this year seems to us to alter the Em-
bassy's basic opinion that, although they are prepared to assume
grave risks in the pursuit of their objectives, the Soviet leaders do not
desire to engage themselves in global conflict in the near future. Their
actions appear to indicate that they hope to make most effective use
of their existing strength through championing world peace move-
ments on the one hand and inflating a war scare on the other with a
view to establishing a revolutionary situation on a world scale in
which the military might of the USSR and its satellites could be
either the critical element in a violent clash (war between the im-
perialist and anti-imperialist camps), or the power behind the throne
for a grand coup d' tat.
  For victory by either method this dual policy of blandishment and
threat must increase in intensity in order to achieve its purpose of
isolating the US as much as possible from other capitalist govern-
ments and of isolating those capitalist governments that do ,cooperate
with the US from their people. This process reached a certain cre-
scendo with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the spurt in con-
centration on the Stockholm     appeal signature campaign which
accompanied it. Korea fits on what might be termed the left hand of
this policy-demonstration of strength. The Berlin blockade, the
Soviet walkout of UN, Soviet actions in the Baltic, the Soviet atti-
tude on the Austrian treaty, and the Whitsunday demonstration are
all part of this picture. These previous steps all created much ten-
sion and apprehension without entailing for the Soviets direct risk
of military reaction such as might have developed over an attempt


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