54 ‘FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

obtain agreement upon an “effective” inspection system under an inter-
national authority? In other words, the question frequently asked of.
me (and particularly by newspaper men in the area) was whether we
were wise in insisting upon international ownership and management.

The explanation which I take it has been the standard exposition
on this subject is that an inspection system in itself will not serve the
purpose inasmuch as inspection (even assuming it were of an effective
variety) would do no more than disclose the existence of stockpiles
of atomic fuel or of facilities for converting it. Inasmuch as it is rela-
tively simple to “package” atomic fuel in the form of a weapon, it
would do little good by way of assuring a peaceful state to know that
atomic fuel exists in established quantities without at the same time
having assurance that the atomic fuel will not. be e secretly converted
into a weapon for destructive uses.

Specifically, in terms ofthe question which I was repeatedly asked, |
our problem appears to be to give a clear public demonstration of
the fact that an inspection system, in itself, no matter how “effective”,
cannot be sufficient to assure our national security. The confusion
which appears to me to be most prevalent, and therefore most in need |
of clarification, is based upon an assumption that it would be of some
advantage to us—as compared to the present situation of ignorance—
to have some information concerning the stockpiling by the Soviet
Union of dangerous materials and facilities.

In my own judgment, this point has been frequently and adequately

discussed. However, it seems certain that the explanations have not
received. widespread public understanding and, if they ever were
understood by a large number of people, these same people have long
since forgotten the explanations. The questions concerning this aspect
of the problem are closely related to the general desirability and ne-
cessity for a public discussion of the sort referred to in the first
paragraph above. | | | :

 

611. 61/2-1050

The Seoretary of g tate to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosenelt

CONFIDENTIAL. one , --Wasuineron, February 93, 1950.

‘Dear Mrs, Roosnvarr: “Thank you for your letter of February 10
which deals with a problem to which I and my associates in the Depart-
ment are giving the most intense and earnest consideration. We are
acutely aware of the widespread apprehension created by the un-
controlled development of increasingly powerful atomic weapons and
of the need for exploring whatever means offer the slightest prospect
of reaching international. agreement for effective control of these
weapons. The despatch of.a special representative of the President