NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY2


mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces
to attack the'enemy and keep him off balance.
  The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces
in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and pro-
tection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in
being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform
certain basic tasks:
  a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas
in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;
  b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive
forces required for victory are being built up;
  c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the
Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until
the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be
brought to bear;
  d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base
areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and
  e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of
their role in the above tasks.
  In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a
build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a
point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least
these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can
be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific
terms, it is not essential to match item ,for item with the Soviet Union,
but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United
States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface
attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the West-
ern Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines
of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that
in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority
by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential-of the United
States and our allies.
  Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for pro-
tection against-disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In
fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available
are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the
nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremen-
dous forces required -for victory can be built. For example, in both
World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the
end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily
available to prevent the outbreak of .war. In part, at'least, this was
because they had not had the military strength on which to base a
strong foreign policy. At'any rate, it is clear that a ,substantial and
rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support


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