FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


   In connection with page 12 of Section VIII, Dr. Conant asked why
 we should not try to negotiate. He, did not see that failure might in-
 crease the chances of war. Mr. .Nitze pointed out that failure might
 bring things to a head too soon and might increase the risks of war.
 Dr. Conant agreed that-that might be true as far as we are concerned,
 but doubted that the Soviets, with controlled public opinion, would
 be equally affected. Dr. Conant argued that while there was little
 hope for a general settlement within the next ten years, the program
 for the "1960 hope" would be costly, and if a clear-cut attempt
at a
 general settlement were made, it might put the Soviet Union in a
 hole in the cold war, and that failure to arrive at a settlement would
 be a very strong argument for the necessary sacrifices on the part of
 the United States. He emphasized that such an attempt would be a
 powerful weapon in the cold war and could very well be bilateral.
 Mr. Nitze pointed out that the stakes were very high., What we were
 trying to do was to buy 30 years of peace, and we should not use an
 attempt at a' general settlement for propaganda purposes only,
 especially since the failure might increase:the chances of war. Dr.
 Conant suggested that perhaps our general settlement of negotiating
 objectives were too ambitious also..
 In VIII (B), Dr. Conant questioned the role of airsuperiority and
 indicated great skepticism on the effectiveness of air bombing. Regard-
 ing agreement on effective atomic energy control, Dr. Conant doubted
 whether the United States itself would accept such an agreement
 now. He- suggested-that agreement on full information might be a step
 forward and might be. an item in a negotiation. The atomic bomb-is
 a bad weapon from the United States point of view.
 He was very dubious7of any peaceful uses from atomic energy and
 suggested that perhaps a conference with the' Soviet- Union on this
 latter point might be useful, both in the sense;that we would be con-
 tinuing talks and also-it might clear up-the confusion regarding peace-
 ful uses..
 Mr. Arneson questioned the usefulness of any piecemeal approach
 and further pointed out that we may be in too weak a position to carry
on real negotiations at this time. Dr. Conant stated -that perhaps
piecemeal approaches could be used for-the purpose of stalling. It was
pointed out by several-I that both the Soviet Union and the United'
Kingdom took a: Utopian view of atomic power, which would be a
factor in any such discussion., Dr. Conant pointedout, that-this is one
aspect.that could be discussed on its scientific merits.
  Dr. Conant felt we should concentrate' on moving up the 1960 date,
perhaps by cutting back on strategic air power and putting more
emphasis on land forces-and tactical airpower. He believed we would


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