ATIONAL SECURITY ONA:POLICY


own forces, the ramification of this incident might not be settled for
many years.
  Second is the serious current inadequacy of our own military forces,
to the point where, even in order to settle this Korean incident, andi
without considering the millionsof trained Chinese and Russian regu-
ars -which might be used against us in the Far East, we are already
being forced to seriously weaken the defenses of the Uniked States.
   (As example, if the Russians reimpose the Berlin blockade there are
not enough airplanes available to handle simultaneously another Ber-
lin airlift, the Korean campaign, and the absolute minimum airlift
necessary for the military defense of the United States. This is still
true even if we commandeered the planes of all our airlines, which
action would of course seriously cripple the domestic economy.)
   Third is the fact, also presented by the Munitions Board les than
two months ago, that there is no long-range strategic defense plan.
Without such a plan neither the Munitions Board, the Resources
Board, or the State Department can operate with efficiency.
   'In other words, on any really accelerated basis, nobody knows what
 to make, or how much to make, or when, or why.
   If a general war starts tomorrow, therefore, everybody will want
 everything yesterday; and the operating chaos resulting from such
 an approach to joint military-civilian planning would be further
 complicated by the knowledge that any time, from here out, this plan-
 ning might have to also include recognition of -the problems of major
 sabotage and devastating atomic attacks.
   This situation is a far cry from the number of years we have always
 been favored with in the past when it became necessary to handle,
 with relative leisure, military and civilian mobilization.
   Prior to now also there has been no requirement for any true
 civilian defense.

   Those are the facts As we see it, the important point now is to
 first recognize these. facts and then present to the President the actions
 we believe necessary to reduce this critical danger to a minimum as
 quickly as possible.
   How the situation deved is now secondary. What is primary
 is that we arein it; and what would now sem most imp ant is our
 best considered advice to the President as to how to get out of it.,
   Withl this in mind, the Resoures. Board adviss the National
 Security Council to rcommend to the Presidentaction based on the
 two following premises:
    (1) When-they believe .they are ready, the ýSoviet Union plans
to
 attack the United States, because it is their often reiterated intention-
 to rule the world.                 ..


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