FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


position arising from the fact that the discussions which had been
takin4 place on the -future collaboration between the two Govern-
ments had had to be halted by the Fuchs affair. He did not doubt
that the interruption was necessary. However, it now seemed to the
British Government that it was unlikely that any conclusion could
be reached in the discussions, by which he meant that no agreement
could come out of -them for a period of approximately one year. Dur-.
ing that time the British Government would either have to keep its
program in suspension or go forward with it in a way which might
produce difficulties between us (he referred specifically to building
the third pile), and he feared that public opinion would force the
Government to proceed with it in the absence of an agreement. He
asked me whether I saw any way of resolving this difficulty, by speed-
ing up the prospective time table.
  I said that I could not make any helpful suggestion. It seemed to
me quite unwise to resume the discussions during the remaining few
months of the Congressional session, since the fact that discussions
were going on always got into the newspapers and the pre-election
atmosphere was sure to make the -whole situation more difficult.
  I said that Sir Oliver Franks had recently laid before us a British
proposal that we should consult -ogether with the object of bringing
our security regulations into harmony.6 The American side of the
Combined Policy Committee had considered it and thought well of
the proposal, and I thought that in all probability action could be
taken along this line. If a successful conclusion was reached in these
discussions, we could then consider what the next step would be. I said
that I had not had an opportunity to discuss with the Secretary of
Defense or the Acting Chairman of the AEC what should be done
after these discussions, but I ought to be able to do so in due course.
  Mr. Bevin asked whether we were clear in our minds that Congres-
sional action was necessary for full collaboration. I said that we were
clear about this and that this was not simply a matter which rested
in the opinions of Cabinet officers. If at some time in the future a
decision was reached to have full collaboration, you could not as a
practical matter go forward so long as the individuals who would be
involved in it were subject to the possibility of grave violations of the
law.
  Mr. Attlee observed that it was the McMahon Act which had. caused
a breakdown in a program which had been discussed with President
Truman. I said that this was so, but that it was not -a matter within
the control of the President.
  6The British proposal is printed as Annex E to the record of the meeting
of
the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, April 25., p. 557.


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