NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  5. Their remaining immediate objectives (para. 2 d, e, f, and g) are
improbable of achievement without resort to armed force, although
there are still factors in the situation which might well lead the Soviet
rulers to suppose that, in favorable circumstances, they might even-
tually achieve these objectives without the use of Soviet forces.
  6. In pressing to achieve these latter objectives the Soviet rulers
will inevitably impinge upon vital interests of the Western Powers
and thus incur the risk of involvement in a general war through
Western reaction.
  7. In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without
a general war with the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may de-
liberately provoke such a war at the time when, in their opinion, the
relative strength of the USSR is at its maximum. It is estimated that
such a period will exist from now through 1954,* with the peak of
Soviet strength relative to the Western Powers being reached about
1952,t
   8. From the point of view of military forces and economic potential,
the Soviet Union is in a position to conduct a general war now (i.e.,
at least to conduct the campaigns listed in paragraphs 66-68, p. 10),
if the Soviet rulers should consider it desirable or expedient to do so.
   9. Intelligence is lacking to permit a valid prediction as to whether
or when the USSR would actually resort deliberately to a general
war. It must be recognized, however, that a grave danger of general
war exists now, and will exist hereafter whenever the Soviet rulers
may elect to take action which threatens the vital interests of the
Western Powers.
   10. Specifically with respect to the Korean situation, to date there
is insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commit
Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese
Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR
considers the Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the
risk of general war. The probability is that the Soviet Union con-
sidersthat the US will not launch a general war over Chinese Com-
munist intervention in North Korea and the reaction thereto. The
principal risk of general war is through the exercise of Soviet
initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. The probability is
that the Soviet Government has not yet made a decision directly to
launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There is a
good chance that they will not in the immediate future take such a

  *1954 Is assumed to be the date by which North Atlantic Treaty forces In
Europe will have been built up to such strength that they could withstand
the
initial shock of Soviet attack and by which the gap between the military
strength
of the Western Powers and that of the USSR will have begun to close. [Footnote
In the source text.]
  tAfter the USSR has made good certain important deficiencies in atomic
bomb
  stockpile and in certain types, of aircraft and before the Western economy
has
been fully geared for a war effort. [Footnote in the source text.]


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