NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  The profound lesson of Korea was not that we did not know about
the attackbefore it came. No sensible person could expect that. (Gen-
eral analysis, if necessary, if intelligent.)
  The profound lesson of Korea is that, contrary to every action pre-
ceding, the USSR took a step which risked-however remotely--
general war.
  No other action has done this-not even the Berlin Blockade.
  There was no suggestion of an overt act anywhere.
  Suppose, if you wish, and I do, that the Kremlin's best guess was
that we would not pick up the glove.
  Nevertheless, the risk was there. Neither the Kremlin nor any other
Foreign Office acts without understanding that the off chance may
occur.
  Still they acted.
  What this means in terms of programs.
  What thismeans in MDAP.
  Itow the Administration has responded to this all important neze
fact.
  The basic relationships of military power. (Churchill's speech 7-8-
9-10 to 1.) 2
  No need for panic, but many steps needed.
  Among these a vast step up of [notes end at this point].

  2 Reference is to an address on defense policy by former Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill in the House of Commons on July 27. Churchill contrasted
the military weakness of the West with the strength of Soviet forces. For
text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 478,
cols.
699-7140

S/S Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 68 Series
Memorandum     by the Chairman of the National Security Resources
  Board (Symilngton) to the Executive Secretary of the Natioral
  Security Council (Lay)1

TOP SECRET                         WASHINGTON, September 5, 1950.
  For many years a group of determined men have been pushing
with practical realism the religion of communism.
  Over 30 years ago some of this group obtained control of one of the
world's great nations-Russia.
  Since then the most outstanding characteristics of their actions.
have been:

  I This memorandum was circulated to the members of the National Security
Council by the Executive Secretary on September 6 for consideration in con-
nection with the preparation of the response to NSC 68.


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