WESTERN .-HEMISPHERE DEFENSE


   d. The protection of vital lines of communication.
   e. The provision, development, operation and protection by Latin
 American nations of those bases that may be required for use of the
 United States and for the protection of lines of communication.
   f. The coordinated protection by member nations of their own
 national areas from invasion and from raids.
   g. The provision by Latin American nations of those armed forces
 necessary for the accomplishment of the foregoing.
   h. The provision by Latin American nations, for the support of the
United States in other theaters, of those, forces beyond their require-
ments for the accomplishment of the foregoing.
   7. No U.S. strategic concept need be or should be disclosed but
 rather the position taken that the United States, while having under
 consideration various alternative lines of action in the event of war,
 has fixed on no rigid course with respect to Latin America and would
 welcome suggestions looking toward the evolution of a strategic
 Western Hemisphere concept on the basis of which common action
 might be undertaken.
   8. The Latin American representatives to the IADB evidently
 desire to plan for the collective defense of the Western Hemi-
 sphere. This desire, properly channeled and given reasonable time in
 which to develop capabilities, could have the greatest benefits in assist-
 ing the United States in her many defense responsibilities in the
 Western Hemisphere and in adding to the total armed strength avail-
 able for use in other theaters. In the event a major war of aggression
 occurs, no steps taken to encourage military cooperation in the
 Western Hemisphere will have been wasted.
   9. Every effort should be made to encourage the development and
acceptance by the Latin American representatives of:
  a. A short-term concept envisaging minimum deployment of U.S.
forces to the Caribbean and to Central and South America.
  b. A long-term strategic concept envisaging the Latin American
nations becoming capable of contributing, for use in other theaters,
forces beyond their requirements for local defense and protection of
LOC's.
  10. Every effort should be made from the outset to contain demands
on the U.S. for material military assistance within manageable limits.
  11. The U.S. delegation will indicate no acquiescence in:
  a. Any military plan which might jeopardize or even unduly in-
fluence global strategy in favor of either direct military assistance or
distribution of equipment solely for the achievement of political
objectives.
b. ,Any arrangement for the Inter-American Defense Board's com-
mand participation in Western Hemisphere. strategy,.


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