FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950,, VOLUjME T


                              [Annex]
                   National Intelligence Estimate
                              [Extract]
 TOP SECRET                       [WASHINGTON,] 15 November 1950.

 NIE-3
                SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
                           THE PROBLEM
   1. To estimate Soviet capabilities and intentions with particular
 reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engage
 in a general war.
                            CONCLUSIONS
   2. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations related to the posi-
tion of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their ultimate objective is
to establish a Communist world controlled by themselves or their
successors. However, their immediate concerns, all consistent with that
objective, are:
  a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the
Soviet Union.
  b:.To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the
territory of the Soviet Union.
  c. To consolidate-control over the European and Asian satellites (in-
cluding Communist China).
  d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and
to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable
of threatening the Soviet position.
  e. To eliminate US influence in Europe and Asia.
  f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.
  g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally,
especially to undermine the power and influence of the US.
  The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives
simultaneously. In case Of conflict between one and another of these
objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will
attach greater importance to the first- four listed, and in that order.
  3. Inasmuch as the Soviet ultimate objective is immutable and
dynamic, the Soviet Union will continue relentlessly its aggressive
pressures on the non-Soviet world, particularly on the power position
of the Western nations. Consequently there is, and will continue to be,
grave danger of war between the USSR and its satellites, on the one
hand, and the US and its allies on the other.
  4. The Soviet rulers could achieve and are achieving the first three
of their immediate objectives (para. 2 a, b, and c) without risk of
involvement in armed conflict with the United States.


414.