-. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY —— 343

Soviet intentions. However despite these differences in estimate, all
studies on this subject which have been conducted in State and Defense.
agree on the following conclusions: oe

1. The Soviet Union has the military capability at the present time
of taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging from
local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the
Soviet world to all-out general war. a a

2. While estimates of probabilities of Soviet action vary it is com-
pletely agreed that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm opin-
ion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of the actions
which le within its military capabilities. = ;

3. There is unanimous agreement, therefore, that the present world
situation is one of extreme danger and tension which, either by Soviet
desire or by the momentum of events arising from the Korean situa-
tion in which actual warfare is in progress, could present the United _
States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including
general hostilities. | ee

There are definite signs that the United States reverses in Korea
have brought discouragement and dismay to our friends and it is to
be expected that as long as these reverses continue this feeling will
deepen, possibly even to the point where our friends and our allies
will begin seriously to question the validity of their military and politi-
cal association with the United States. For the same reason our re-
verses will tend to render more confident and arrogant our enemies
and increase accordingly the possibility that they will be emboldened
to take greater risk to achieve certain objectives than heretofore.

It is therefore obvious that it is urgently necessary for the United
States to initiate measures necessary to bring about a rapid build-up
of the United States military position both in manpower and in pro-
duction in order to place us as speedily as possible in a military situa-
tion commensurate with the present state of international affairs.
Among others the chief reasons for such action may be listed as
follows: | a | -

1. Vital necessities of U.S. national defense. | a

2. The possible deterrent effect upon our enemies of evidence that
the U.S. is seriously mobilizing its strength, as an offset to the encour-
agement they would receive from our reversesin Korea. __ —

3. The heartening effect particularly in the field of military
production that such action would have upon our allies. | oO

[Attachment]

U.S. Actions Requrrep to Minimize toe Lixenroop or Soviet Ac-
GRESSION OR OF NEw Soviet-Insprrep Accression AND To Dean Wirt
Sucw Accression Ir Ir Occurs | |

1. From the political point of view, we can most reduce the likeli-
hood of further Soviet and Soviet-inspired aggressive moves by a