NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


removal of ruling groups or injury to vested interests. OneImight
generalize that the degree of underlying success in the cold war to date
has been in direct ratio to the success in adjusting social and economic
:structures to the twentieth century wave of economic egalitarianism-
even though themethods have frequently been inept and have violated
our concepts of a desirable and efficient economic system.
   These adjustments are not being (made in many of the critical areas
 of the world today. We are being increasingly forced into associations
 which are exceedingly strange for a people of our heritage and ideals.
 It can be persuasively argued that there is no alternative course. If
 so, we should not be blind to the gaping weakness which is forced
 upon us, which will grow rather than decline as time passes, and of
 which above all others the Russians, with their talents for subversion,
 are able to take advantage. This is a major dilemma of American
 foreign policy, and deals with a subject much more difficult than
 making guns. In many countries today, for example, there is a simple
 test question: Is there no way to attain thorough-going land reform
 except through Communist revolution?- It is highly doubtful that we
 are actually so handicapped in our choice of friends or limited in our
 influence on policies. At any rate, we will never make use of our oppor-
 tunities as long as the issue is submerged, as it is in NSC 68. Indeed,
 we seem today to be exerting decisive influence in the wrong direct-ion
 in some places, such as Western Germany.
 The above comments do not detract from the seriousness of the
 military situation, nor necessarily weaken the case for increasing and
 re-orienting our military strength and for assisting other countries to
 defend themselves. But unless we are prepared to undertake extensive
 military occupation, we cannot win the cold war by a predominant
 reliance on military force even if combined with large-scale dollar
 assistance. Nor is it sufficient to add preachments of the concepts of
 democracy in terms too sophisticated for understanding or too remote
 from th6e particular issues foremost in the minds of the peoples. Only
 as we develop methods for capitalizing on the emerging social pres-
 sures can we beat the Russians at their most dangerous game and safely
 take advantage of.a rising tide of nationalism.
 A revealing commentary on NSC 68 is that it does not basically
 clarify or utilize the Chinese experience in the discussion of issues and
 risks, nor does it point toward a course of action which can effectively
 deal with probable repetitions of that experience in the future. There
 is no follow-through on the social and economi'c schisms which today
 provide the basic ggroundswell for disorder and weakness, which make
our task s0 difficult, and for which we have not developed guidelines
and techniques adequate to cope with the vicious "ideological pre-
tensions" and methods of the Communists. A revolutionary move-


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