NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


evidence in other ways of its good ,faith and its intent to co-exist in
peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.
  Clearly unider present circumstances we will not be able to negoti-
ate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. ,What,
then, is the role of negotiation?
  In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free
countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate
programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the
free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with
the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people
here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are
possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to
show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.
  The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate
and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation.
They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and
the terms on which they would be prepared-and at what stages-to
accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in
the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they
must be consistent with a positive program for peace-in harmony with
the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the
effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor
organization. The terms must not require ,more of the Soviet Union
than such behavior and such participation in a world organization.
The. fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossiblewithout
such ýa radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change
in the
Soviet system would then emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwill-
ingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.
   A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in
the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up
strength, :any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settle-
ment along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State
could be only a tactic.11 Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision

  ii The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union
could
modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable
security. These were:
  1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures
  in the Far East;
  2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite area;
  3. Cooperation in the United Nations;
  4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
  5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
  6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U.S.;
  7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other
  countries. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of the address delivered
by
  Secretary Acheson at the University Of California, Berkeley, on March 16,
1950,
concerning United States-Soviet relations, see Department of State Bulletin,
March 27, 1950, pages 473-478.]


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