914             FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

   Cecil said Foreign Office would be helped in thinking about question
 by information on two points:
   1. What effect, if any, this note has on current US thinking r&
 Chilean "standstill" proposals-about which Foreign Office does
not
 know officially. Cecil's view is status Chilean note might affect timing
 of Foreign Office reply since if Russians should hear of Chilean pro-
 posals, USSR could use that as excuse either push own views or point
 out to UN Russian views being ignored, et cetera.
   2. Position US thinking about possibility putting in US claim to.
 parts Antarctica. Foreign Office would not want to have anything in
 their reply which could embarrass US since its interest in Antarctica.
 on different grounds from that of other interested parties.2
                                                               DOUGLAS.
  2 Telegram 179, July 12, to London, not printed, instructed the Embassy
to-
  reply informally to the Foreign Office as follows:
  "No US reply imminent. Dept will wish exchange views with other interested
  govts before making reply. Effect Soy note is to emphasize desirability
agree-
  ment on territorial status Antarctica. As progress this direction and nature
reply
  to USSR depend partly on Chilean response our proposal re suggested modus
  vivendi, Dept asked Chilean Emb informally for Chilean thinking, however
  preliminary. No new developments re question 2." (702.022/7-4250)
  Telegram 454, July 21, from London, not printed, reported that the information
  provided by the Department had been transmitted to the Foreign Office (702.022/
  7-2150). Despatch 1747, October 13, from London, not printed, reported
having
  been informed by the Foreign Office that the British were discussing with
,th&
  Australians and the New Zealanders the possibility of making no reply at
all to
  the Soviet communication of June 9 (702.022/10-4350).

702.022/7-2050
Memorandaim     of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of British
      Commonwealth- and Northern European Affairs (Hulley)

CONFIDENTIAL                             [WAsHImTGTON,j July 20, 195a.
Participants: Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
                Benjamin M. Hulley-BNA
                Grant G. Hilliker-BNA'
   Mr. Meade came in pursuant to the same Foreign Office instruction
of July 4 that had occasioned the visit of Mr. Boyd on July 12 because
Mr. Boyd, he said, "did not get the right answers." -
   After I had read the instruction We discussed generally the question
of replying to, the Soviet note. I repeated that tentatively our feeling
was that there was no need for haste in making a reply, particularly
in view of the Korean situation. Indeed I was not sure that any reply

  John (r. Boyd, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, visited the Depart-
ment of State on July 12 for a preliminary discussion of the Soviet communica-
tion of June 8 on Antarctica (see p. 911). Boyd brought with him a copy of
his
instructions of July 4 from the Foreign Office presenting British views on
the
Soviet communication substantially as reported in telegr am 3447, June 19,
from
London, supra (memorandum of conversation by Grant G. Hilliker, July 12,
1930,
702.022/7-1250).