FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be
possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy"
type
amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent
of Europe.

. After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and con-
solidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simul-
taneously conduct:
  a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British
Isles;
  b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;
  c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air
operations against the North American continent, and air and sea
operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and
  d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.
  During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second
and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air de-
fense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its
satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air
operations against these areas.
  It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves
and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even
its own forces throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest
of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, sinc the possi-
bility of defections would exist.
  It is not possible at this time to.assess accurately the finite disadvan-
tages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through the implementa-
tion of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as am-nded, and the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act, of 1949. Itt should be expected that, as
this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of
the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a
strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments
of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination
of the recipient nations to counter !Soviet moves and in event of war
could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time
required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. Inall proba-
bility, although United States backing will stiffen their determination,
the armaments increase under -the present aid :programs will not be of
any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the mililtary strength of
the Western European nations is increased ona much larger scale than
under current programs and At an accelerated rate, it is more than
likely that those nations will not be .able to oppose even by 1960 the
Soviet aurmed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Consider-
ing the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military
objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased' military


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