FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0 VOLUME I


ern Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because
the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would,
therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory inter-
national order among nations. Victory in such a war would have
brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental
ideological conflict.
  These considerations are no less weighty because they are impond-
erable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the
nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to
be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow be-
come increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact
which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full
weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet
blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter-IV is accepted,
it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the only sure
vic-
tory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady develop-
ment of the moral and material strength of the free world and its
projection into the Soviet world in such a way as -to bring about an
internal change in the Soviet system.
D. The Remaining Course of Action-a Rapid Build-up of Political,
     Econondc, and Military Strength in the Free World.
   A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength
 and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated
 is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving
 our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design re-
 quires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political
 and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the
 Soviet Union. These, in turn, require -an adequate military Shield
 under- which they can develop. It 'is necessary to have the military
 power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if neces-
 sary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total
 character. The potential-strength of the free world is great; its ability
 to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist 'Soviet ex-
 pansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it
 undertakes to meet-its political and economic problems.
   1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI tthat U.S.
 military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than
 offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an
 analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that
 there is-now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history
 of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved
 through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be suc-
 cessful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while


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