540 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

Department of State paper of that date \ were approved by the Special
Committee, and on the same date by the President. >

At the meeting I expressed orally grave reservations about Recom-
mendation a; namely: “That the President direct the Atomic Energy
Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a
thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined —
jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of —
Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments a and carrier
program be undertaken concurrently.”

I expressed hearty agreement with Recommendation 3, whereby
the President directs a “re-examination of our objectives in peace and
war of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans,” and stated
that I believed this would be the most important factor of all in the
assignment to the Special Committee and its recommendations.

At the meeting on January 31 I discussed orally the reasons for my
reservations about Recommendation a. as a course to be pursued at
this time. I have requested of the Executive Secretary and have
received his permission to append to the record of the Special Com-
mittee’s Report and Recommendations a summary of the basis for
my views. Such summary is as follows: |

It was my view that the President’s publicly announced decision |
directing the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the
technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon would be construed,
and inevitably construed, as a very broad and far-reaching decision
respecting the hydrogen bomb; that such an announced decision by
the President would seriously prejudice the re-examination of our
present course, provided for by Recommendation b.-

The central question for the Special Committee it seemed to me.was
_not whether we should recommend proceeding with the super bomb
or recommend against it. The central question, so it seemed to me,
was whether we should not first face up to the weaknesses in our
present national position. I outlined the points of weaknesses which
had occurred to me as a result of discussions during the past few
weeks. The decision to proceed, prior to such a solid re-examination,
would I fear tend to confirm to a degree almost beyond change our
present chief and almost sole reliance upon nuclear armament. I stated
it as my opinion that in our major and almost sole reliance upon atomic
“weapons, we are resting our security largely on an asset that is steadily
depreciating for us, i.e. weapons of mass destruction. The President’s
decision, would I feared, tend to make far more difficult a realistic
re-examination of our position and an effort to find, if possible, some
more solid course or series of courses.

| a _ Davin E, Linrentaan