WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE


be ready for the only possibility of war that can be considered now
that we have the Treaty, namely, aggression against America coming
from outside of America. But if we were going to build up in each
Latin American country armies and armaments capable of individual
defense against any aggressor that might dare to challenge the
hemisphere, united by the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, we would have
condemned our peoples to poverty; we would have sacrificed them to
the prospect of having to defend themselves when their domestic
economy had been weakened by huge expenses that the majority of
them are not capable of meeting, and ought not to meet if they have
any real conception of the relative importance of their respective
fundamental problems. The Conference did not hesitate to condemn
any armament policy that goes beyond what is necessary and indis-
pensable for the common defense. And that concept, stated in a resolu-
tion, should be taken into full account and even be considered as one
criterion in interpreting the Treaty and the spirit behind it."
   The foregoing comment indicates the desirability of a reexamina-
 tion of the approach to and the interpretation of the implementation
 of the-Rio Treaty as set forth in NSC/56.
       BACKGROUND OF INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION
   Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the NSC paper deal with inter-American
 military cooperation "in order to achieve complete acceptance of U.S.
 military standards". It is stated in paragraph 6 that the Latin Ameri-
 can nations are aware of the existence of this standardization pro-
 gram, and have eagerly awaited its implementation since 1945, and
 have considered themselves bound by the inter-American treaties and
 by the bilateral staff conversations to the principles contained in the
 President's directive.
   Paragraph 5 observes that the continuance of the establishment of
U.S. military missions in Latin America, the training of foreign na-
tionals in United States institutions, and combined joint staff plan-
ning "is contingent upon the provision, by the United States, of the
armaments required by the Latin American nations for the mainte-
nance of armed forces in being". It also is stated in paragraph 16
that "it devolves upon the United States to find ways and means to
enable Latin American governments to procure arms to the extent
necessary to ensure their continued interest and cooperation.".
  All of these assertions appear to be questionable in the light of the
principal pertinent documents, namely SWNCC 4/10, SANACC
360/11, and 360/12,9 and the Presidents message of May 1946 regard-
ing "The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act".10

  "For text of SANACC 360/11, as amended by SANACC 360/12 and 360/13,
under cover of memorandum SANA-6333, March 16, 1949, see Foreign Relations,
1949, vol. i, p. 257.
  10 Text in Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1946, p. 859. For pertinent
documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. xi, pp. 86 f.
     496-362-77----40


613