FOREIGN RELA'TIONS, 19l9-50, VOLUME I


provide :a- reiasoable measureOf protection to the Western"Hemi-
sphere, bases, in the 'Western -Pacific, and essential military lines of.
communication; and an inadequate measure of protection to -vital
military bases in the United Kingdom'and in the Near and: Middle
East. We will have the capability of conducting powerful offensive
air operations against vital: elements of the Soviet- War-making
capacity.
  'The scale of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph is
limited by the effective forces and material in- being of -the- United
States and its allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Consistent-withe:
aggressive threat -facingus and :in consonance with overall strategic
plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a continuing
basis as large amounts of military assistance as possible without
serious detriment to the United States operational requirements.-
  If the potential military capabilities of the United States and its
allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient forces could be
produced probably to deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war,
to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting attacks,
and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact on the Soviet capa-
bilities. From the military point of view alone, however, this would
require not only the generation of the necessary military forces but
also the development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all
types.
  Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from two to three
years is required to produce a material increase in-military power.
Such increased power could be provided in a somewhat shorter period
in a declared period of emergency or in wartime through a full-out
national effort. Any increase in military power in peacetime, how-
ever, should be related both to its probable military role in war, to -the
implementation of immediate and long-term United States foreign
policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to the realities of the existing
situation. If such a course of increasing our military power is adopted
now, the United States would have the capability of eliminating the
disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the situa-
tion we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in the "cold"
war
and of materially delaying if not stopping the 'Soviet offensives in
war itself.
                         VIw  RESENT RISKS
A. General
  It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and
vitality of our system is in greater jeopardythan ever before in our
history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the.great
problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial


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