NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


377,


  3. These actions which the United States with its allies should now
be taking to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression, and:
to increase our ability to defeat aggression, are not included in this:
report, although their critical importance should not be overlooked°
The present situation requires many such measures, some of which
are now being undertaken. Others are under study and will be the
subject of subsequent recommendations, including those which will
flow from NSC 68. These measures should be taken regardless of
future Soviet actions so long as the USSR retains its present capa-
bilities and intentions to threaten the security of the United States.
General
  4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and
non-communist countries is inevitable. This conviction is a basic
premise in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has
shown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from
local objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined first
to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to promote
world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the United
States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degradation,
weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are essential
to the attainment of the aims of the USSR.
   5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves directed by
 the USSR, it is essential to take into account estimated Soviet military
 capabilities and, in so far as possible, to assess Soviet intentions. The
 USSR has the military capability to occupy any country on its
 periphery, to invade Western Europe and the Near and Middle East,
 to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska and
 upon shipping, and to reinforce the communist military effort in the
 Far East. The USSR also has the capability of initiating limited-
 scale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is not,
 however, believed to have at the present time the capability ,of pre-
 venting the United States from carrying -out an atomic attack. On
 the other hand, the USSR may have the capability of reducing our
 industrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and
 satellite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without
 openly committing its own forces, would confront the United States
 and its allies with the following alternatives: abandoning positions
 of vital political and strategic importance, committing and dissipat-
 ing available strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or
 undertaking global war.
   6. Given these capabilities, which have existed ifor some time and
 a re progressivelyincreasing, an attempt must be made, in the light of