NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY _ 230

words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against

the Soviet Union. _

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political
and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage
and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-
measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be
inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary con-
siderations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our

very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frus-
trate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained
for as long as necessary to achieve our national obj ectives. It would

probably involve:

(1) The development of an adequate political and economic frame-
work for the achievement of our long-range objectives.

(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes
adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.

(3) A. substantial increase in military assistance programs, de-
signed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and ef-
ficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to
in Section D-1-e.

(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recogni-
tion of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have
been accomplished.

(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance
of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

(6) Development of programs designed to build and maintain con-
fidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to
wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defec-
tions from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design i im
other ways.

(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and opera-
tions by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and. political
and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and suppor ting
unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries. _

(8) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.

(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities. |

(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than
defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of cer-
tain desirable programs. :

(11) Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be
(a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the
program the object. of non-partisan legislative support, and (5) a
presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and i im-
pleations ¢ of present intern ational trends. - |