FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


   Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us
 to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the
 superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and
 to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in
 such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of
 the Soviet system.
   For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by
 deterring an 'attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an
 environment in which our free society can flourish, 'and by fighting, if
 necessary, to defend 'the integrity and vitality of our free society and
 to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses !Soviet military power to
 back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use mili-
 tary force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement
 of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the
 Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective 'attitudes
 toward 'and use of military force.
   Our free society, confronted by'a threat to its basic values, naturally
 will take such action, including the use of military force, 'as may
 required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will nott
be
 jeopardized 'by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent,
 which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does
 the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in
 actions .as well 'as words forbid such measures, provided only they are
 appropriately calculated to that end and ,are not so excessive or mis-
 directed as. to-make.-us enemies of the .people instead of -the evil men
 who have enslaved them.
   But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that
the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the
regime and its power for aggression, and-not against their own inter-
ests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch
fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created,
.and where our basic principles are obscured ,and compromised. If we do
not in the application of 'force demonstrate the n'ature of our objectives
we will, in ifact, have compromised -from the outset our fundamental
purpose. 'In the words of.the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be em-
ployed must"'be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The
mis-
chief may 'be a global war or it may be a ,Soviet campaign for limited
objectives.'In either case we should take no 'avoidable initiative which
would cause it to become a war of annihilation, 'and if we have the
,forces to defeat .a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to
our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force
-must beto compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objec-
tives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore,
within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be con-
gruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.


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