REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


damage a few bombs from the other side might do in view of our
  delicately organized system.
  Mr. Arnescn pointed out that despite our position not to foster
  debate, it would undoubtedly develop. It was our position to continue
  to support the United Nations control plan and at the same time to
  make clear that we did not contend that we had exhausted all human
  ingenuity on the subject, and would welcome any other proposals. He
  indicated that the Department had not "rested on its oars" in
this
  matter and had tried to consider alternatives, following the great
  debate on the hydrogen bomb and the news of the Soviet discovery.
  The Atomic Energy Commission had been asked whether, in the light
  of these developments, the plan still worked; could it be improved
  upon; and did it cover the hydrogen bomb. The Commission answered
  that the plan still worked and did cover the new bomb; accordingly
  we were standing by the United Nations plan.
  We had been unable to find any other proposals and would welcome
  any. We would listen sympathetically to any ideas proposed in this
  Assembly. He reviewed the background of the United Nations plan.
  The continued Soviet refusal to accept the plan, in his view, con-
  stituted a grave danger since it implied that the Soviets would not
  cooperate in this case or elsewhere. He emphasized that the plan re-
  flected not only the views of the United States but suggestions by
  France and others, and had been accepted by nine of the eleven
  Security Council Members in 1948. Because of the Soviet position, it
  appeared that the Commission could not continue to work usefully,
  and the permanent members had been requested to constitute them-
  selves a forum to see whether any basis for agreement existed or could
  be reached. There had been lengthy meetings during 1949 without
  agreement, but these consultations had broken down with the Soviet
  walk-out early in 1950. Mr. Arneson believed that this forum of the
  six sponsoring powers should be continued. It had flexible rules, met
  in secrecy, and as often as it wished; it could consider any proposals.
  Mr. Arneson recalled that a series of suggestions had been made during
  the last Assembly, but the permanent members had not been able to
  begin on them before the Soviet walk-out. He did not believe reopen-
ing negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission would be useful.
  Mr. Arneson described the relationship between this problem and
conventional armaments. It was recognized that the two must be
brought "in phase" together. Neither could be worked out without
a
basic agreement on the control system.
  Mr. Cohen was still concerned with the fact that, although things
could not be changed over-night, we had not gone far enough to
satisfy the American people and the world of our concrete thinking
on these problems. He thought the situation required at least an


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