154 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

a reasonable likelihood exists in the case of most of the principal
issues, the prompt commencement of negotiations for a general settle-
ment would clearly be called for; but if it should appear that, given
the essential interests of the West and the fixed dogmas of the East,
there is little likelihood of accommodation on the great issues, it would
seem preferable to continue the present practice of negotiating each
issue separately in the appropriate forum, in the UN or in conjunction
with our Allies, for to commence a negotiation for a general settle-
ment and to fail might easily be worse’than not to negotiate at all.

There are discussed briefly below the principal issues which divide
East and West at this time. It should be emphasized that any settle-
ment, in order to be successful in ending, or substantially moderating,
the cold war, would have to resolve at least a majority of these issues,
and those the most important.

1. Cooperation with the UN. In a sense this constitutes the most
basic issue of all since sincere cooperation with the UN on the part of
the Soviet Union would either in itself resolve most of the outstanding
issues or would make them relatively unimportant as far as world
peace is concerned. It would hardly be possible, however, to negotiate
fruitfully so vague a proposition as “sincere cooperation with the
UN”. Each side would claim that it is already cooperating sincerely
and that the other is not. This issue would therefore, in any nego-
tiation, have to be broken down into a number of concrete questions
on which we consider that the Soviet Union is not cooperating with
the UN. The most important of these are the following: |

__ A. Control of Atomic Energy This is the topic on which
there is the most widespread demand that negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union be undertaken. In order
to avoid creating a fear that we are deserting our Allies and
attempting a bilateral settlement contrary to their interests, we
should have to insist on continuing negotiations within the UN.
This would not create a serious stumbling block if a real will to
agree existed. In essence the position of the two parties seems,
however, hopelessly far apart. The West insists that effective con-
trol of atomic energy is essential to atomic disarmament and that

_ control to be effective must follow all quantities of uranium and
_ plutonium and their products through all stages of processing.
The West further contends that this latter safeguard can only be
effective if the materials in question are not only observed by,
but also managed and owned by, an international institution
throughout all these processes. Whether or not this last contention
is correct, it seems inconceivable that the Soviet leaders, in view
of their psychosis on the subject of security and their determina-

“For documentation on efforts to achieve the international control of atomic
energy, see pp. 1 ff. an » . |