FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


  The first issue discussed was the meaning of the term "utmost
urgency" both with respect to the timing and the magnitude of the
program. A two-page statement 7 was presented on behalf of the Ad
Hoc Committee defining this term. After considerable discussion it
seemed generally agreed that the programs contemplated in the draft
response would not accomplish the objectives set forth in NSC 68 with
sufficient speed. General doubt was expressed as to the adequacy of
the programs, and particularly of the military programs as set forth
in the draft document.
  The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers restated the
views of the Council as to the impact upon the domestic economy, but
pointed out that these views might require revision if the programs
were very substantially increased.
  Doubt was expressed as to whether realistic estimates could be pro-
jected beyond FY 1952, but it was noted that the effort to project the
estimate through 1955 would be valuable even though these figures
were highly tentative for the latter years.
  As a result of the discussion it was agreed:
  a. that the President should be asked to extend the September 1
deadline to September 15 (in which event the deadline for submission
of the report to the Council would be September 9) ;
  b. that emphasis should be placed on realistic cost estimates for
FY 1951 and 1952 but an effort would be made to project the estimates
through 1955;
  c. that the Defense and JCS members would undertake to obtain
revised military programs and cost estimates based upon a restatement
of the military objectives of the build-up;
  d. that the Ad Hoe Committee should continue its work of perfect-
ing the draft of the response, incorporating the new military programs
and estimates when received.
                                               JAMES S. LAY, JR.
  Not printed.


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