~EULATIO  FAM~ET


33


   2. With respect to conventiuRal armaments, there could be, at ths
 stageA no questionAof 'anyai prohibition-A---mly of reductions.i~u reduc-
 tions are extremely hardtoI arrange unless there is a, fair degree .of
 ecomparability between thepestablishments of the respective countries,
 in sizeas w ,el as in type. In the case of the US, a4nd ,U..S., this
 cmparability iscon.spic-o.,usly - acking.. The sale, on-which the $ovet
 ground forc. stablishment, i main.tained is so out of proportion to
 thtof, our own that our ground forces would be; substantlly
 balanced out justby theSovtiet police' army.:aone, tQ whch Soviet
 representatives never refer.in international negotiations land which
 they obviously.do not regard even as a potential object of dicussion
 ,from :the :Standipoiint of; reoduction f armament, Furthermore, their
 systeml iof* military training and of disciplin ar Contrl over the popu-
 lation means that demobilized soldiers could be re-obilized with
 great speed and effectiv eessIn the light of these facts, it is clear
 that even if the Soviet Government consented-to demobilize .uni-
 laterally most: ofthe RedArmy, with no reductio at all on our part,
 itwu~ld still have both forces i existencee aid:a capability for
 mobilization entirely adequaýte to balance, all the AtlanticVPact
eoun-
 tries could conceivably put up in this line in the foreseeable future.
 Since i~t would certainly not do anything remotely as generous as
 this, but: would insist on heavy and significant reduction.s i western
 forces as against-only such reductions on its own partl as woud leave
 at least the. major part.of the present Red Army intact, it is hard to
 conceive of: any arrangement for reduction in ground-forces which
 would be within the bounds of realistic. possibility and which Could
 yet operate to the advantage of the western powers.
   3. It has been suggested that possibly the Soviet Government might
 be prevailed upon to go in for a mutual reduction of offensive weapons
 such as tanks,: long-range bombers-and submarines, and that in this
 way the total Soviet potential could be at leas-t rduced to a point
 where western Europe would no longer feel threatened. Itisdifficult
 to follow this line of reasoning .through to any very hopeful con-
 clusion. Aside from the almost insuperable problem of verification
:and controtlof any'such undertakings, the Russians would certainly
not be interested in"them if they altered the general military balance
:in Europe- to he Sovet disfavor. Yet if they did not so alter it, they
could hardflycarry- any real .reassurance -to the peoples of e.strn
Tiuropeý. Moreover," itseems, doubtful-if the distinctioi between
offen-
siveand. defensivey weaons has any practical validity.
   4'. Any'commit"ment on the -part of'any of the western powers to
Treduce eonventionat armed' establishments could hardly fail to fall
foul of the 'At-lanticN Pat:i.e., ofs the bligations contained in that
pact, and oqf-the military p!anning accomplished within its frame-
work. NQ Atlpatic Pac.t power could now negotiate alone with the
Russians about the reduction of conventional armaments. This is in
itself enough to make any'practical result highly unlikely, for nothing
is harder"than international-negotiation by a-group of sovereign
power-s. Moreover,-]prpoals for any actual reduction in western
strength, along lines which would be of interest to -the Russians, would
pobPbly run directly counter to the.purposes af theMilitary Asist-
ance Progrm     n   oolgtos sue            ncneto       herew ith.