FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19.5 0, VOLUME I


  All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary
in peace and war. But every consideration ,of devotion to our funda-
mental values and to our national security demands that we seek to
achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing
the moral and material strength-of the free world that the Soviet
regime will become convinced of the .falsity of its assumptions and
that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By
practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the
free world widens the area :of possible agreement and thus can
hope gradually to bring about a Soviet-acknowledgement of realities
which in"sum will _eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet
design. Short of. this, however, it might be possible to create a situa-
tion which will'induce-the Soviet- Union-to accommodate-itself, with
or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence
on tolerable terms Iwith t4henon-Soviet- world. Such a development
would be a triumph 4for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must
be an immediate objective of!United States policy.
  There -is no reason, in the1event of war, forus to alter our over-all
objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subju-
gation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its econonic poten-
tial. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind
the regime which enslaves-them. Rather these objectives contemplate
Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to
an international environment in which free institutions can flourish,
and in which the Russian peoples will have a new .chance to work out
their own destiny. If we can make, the :Russian people our allies in
the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory
more certain.
  The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948)8 and
quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent with the objectives stated in
this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the con-
flict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes
of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the
probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb
capability of-the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us
to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis
unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.
C. Means:
  The free.society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.
  Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to
enforce the rights common to all. The resort .to force, internally or

  'For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vo1. x, P!art 2, P. 662.


242