ATOMIC ENERGY


program directed toward determining feasibility prejudicesthe more
fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of
a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be
stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might
be used in war. If a test off a thermonuclear weapon proves successful,
the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the
same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be
greatly increased. The question of use policy can be 'adequately as-
sessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's
strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamina-
tion would need to consider national policy not only with respect to
possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission
weapon's-viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability
and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.
The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this
problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight.
The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on
the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the
nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic
energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.
   8. There is evidence which leads to the belief that the Soviet Union
prefers to put its chief reliance on winning the cold war rather than
precipitating a hot war. There is also ground for the belief that the
Soviet Union would prefer not to use weapons of mass destruction
except in the event of prior use by others. These assumptions might
appear to argue for renunciation by the United States of work in the
field of thermonuclear ,weapons. We cannot safely assume, however,
that these hypotheses are correct. Even if they are correct, it cannot
be assumed that the Soviet Union would forego development of this
weapon any more ,than she has been willing to forego the development
of the fission bomb. Sole possession by the Soviet Union of this weapon
would cause severe damage not only to our military posture but to our
foreign policy position.
  9. There is also the question of possible effect on Soviet attitudes
and actions of a decision to proceed with a program to test the feasi-
bility of thermonuclear weapons.
  a. Would a decision on the part of the United States to go ahead
with an accelerated program 1cause the Soviet Union to press ahead in
this field more vigorously? The theoretical possibilities of a thermo-
nuclear reaction 'have long been known; as early as 1932 there were
suggestions by Russian scientists and others that thermonuclear reac-
tions might release enormous amounts of energy (Appendix A). The


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