0FOREIGNRELATIONS,).1950, VOLUME I


Measured against this alternative, an imperfect system of international
control seems to me less dangerous, and more :considerate of those
things in international life which are still hopeful.
                               VIII
  To ask that these views find general acceptance in this :Government
is asking a great deal; and the likelihood that this -should happen at
any arly date seems so slight that I am not sure how useful it is to
try tQ spell out what we should do: about-interna tiona control in such
a contingency. A few suggestions along this line might serve, however,
to show what our problem would still be in such a situation.
  Our first task would be to thresh this question out with those nations
who have supported our leadership in the U.N.AE.C. We would have
to inform these governments, in discussions as informal and private
as they could be made, of the background of-our attitude, and to
explQre with them what might conceivably be acceptable along the
lines of the suggestions contained in Section II of this report. If we
did not run into difficulty elsewhere, we would almost certainly have
difficulty in persuading the British to consider the abolition of large
reactors. It is probable that if they could he brought to this point
at all, it WoUld only be slowly and after repeatedexchan-ges of views.
If they still refused to consider such a possibility, we would quite
possibly have to regard ourselves as having come again to the end
of our rope in the question of international control. In such a case
we would presumably wish t shift responsibility to the British for
the failure to make headway in the international control problem. It
might then be necessary for us to make some public statement indi-
cating our own willingness to consider solutions which might vary
from  the present U.N. plan, and explaining why we could go no
farther along this line.
   If, however, the outcome of oonsultations with friendly powers
 (presumably this would be the other members of "the Six" excuding
 the Soviet Union). indicated a ,possibilityof taking soundings with
 the'Russians, we wouldthen wish to seek some suitable quiet channel
 of bilateral discussion with Soviet representatives along the lines of
 the Malik-Jessup talks on the Berlin blockade.4 The exact channel
 need not be determined until the time comes. It would be desirable
 that the person. conducting the discussions on our side be someone
 familiar with Soviet psychology and negotiating techniques,' .and
 someone whom they will recognize as probably close'to the real source
 of iauthority in this Government. This person would try to arrange

 SFor, documentation on conversations between Ambassad-or-atLargePhiflip
(.
 Jessp and .Yakav A. faik, Pr maneat.Sviet Represe-tafive a0t-the United
 Nations, March -16-May 4, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. in, pp.
694 ff.


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