464


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


though they may estimate that, the Western Allies would seek to avoid
such a development. Further direct or indirect Soviet aggression in
Europe land Asia is likely, regardless of the outcome of the Korean
situation.") The Secretary might then proceed in the following order:
A. Main Implication of the Imminent Threat
   We are not justified in taking a gamble that the Kremlin is bluffing.
The nation should therefore prepare for the contingency of total war
with the Soviet Union in the immediate future. If we act with the
utmost unity, determination and wisdom the contingency may still
be avoided. If it is not, we shall have done our best to prepare for it.
We are not morally justified in doing less, for to do less would be to
imperil national survival.
B. The Importance of Buying Time if Possible
   During the period of military weakness vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. our
basic objective must be to survive with honor iand to build a platform
from which we can subsequently go on to a successful -outcome of the
life-land-death struggle in which we are engaged with the Kremlin.
We must avoid becoming involved in general hostilities with the
U.S.S.R. in our present position of military weakness if this is ait all
possible without sacrificing our self-respect and without endangering
our survival.
C. Domestic Preparedness Measures
   (1) It would seem wise to (approve immediately as an interim pro-
gram, the JCS recommendation that the 1954 defense targets should
be met as rapidly ,as possible. It is understood that for most of the
program "-as rapidly as possible" means 1952 or earlier. In light
of
the estimate of the Council of Economic Advisers' estimate that such
a decision would still not involve a total effort by the United States,
urgent consideration should be given to whether there are not addi-
tional defense measures which it would be wise to adopt in light of
the strategic position of the United States.
   (2) We should be prepared to initiate full mobilization at a
moment's notice.
   (3) In order to get this program under way with the widest pos-
sible national support, it will probably be advisable to declare that the
Kremlin threat to the security of the United States has created an
unlimited national emergency. This would be preferable to a decla-
ration of full mobilization, but if the order for full mobilization were
necessary to obtain a maximum effort, consideration should be given
to it.
   (4) Thorough and continuing joint review of the world political
outlook and our strategic military needs should be begun immediately