NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 159

non-essential particulars as seemed appropriate. Such a presentation
at this unpropitious time might, however, harden rather than soften
the respective positions.

Aside from the question of making clear to Western public opinion
our readiness to negotiate, the more important problem of adopting a
posture in international affairs, which will produce a Soviet willing-
ness to negotiate, might be stated succinctly in six propositions, of the
validity of which it would be the objective of our policy to convince
the Kremlin. These six propositions would be as follows:

1. That the limits of peaceful Communist expansion have been
reached, at least for some time to come. This would mean holding
firmly the line around the present peripheries of the Soviet sphere and
providing the necessary military, political and economic aid so that
the numerous “soft spots” on our side of the periphery are not
absorbed by Communist infiltration and subversion. The most critical
of these spots at this time is South Hast Asia.

9. That expansion by force of arms would be too dangerous to risk.
This involves both the rearmament and, at least to a sufficient degree,
unification of the West.

3. That the West does not intend to launch a war against the Soviet
Union. In view of the Marxist-Leninist dogma that the capitalist
powers are sooner or later bound to launch an: 1 attack on the Socialist
fatherland, it is particularly important to avoid unduly provocative
gestures which might confirm any predisposition to believe that this
attack is about to take place.

4. That there will be at least in the near future NO capitalist eco-
nomac crisis of major proportions. If is of vital importance that we
demonstrate domestically, in Western Europe and in the Western
world generally, that a free economy is able to produce and distribute
generously and continuously. A serious economic depression would
obviously be an enormous boon to the Soviets.

5. That internal political and economic stability within the Soviet
sphere is not assured. "The more the Soviets can be preoccupied with
political and economic difficulties at home, as they were during the
period between the two World Wars, the less likely it is that they will
be able to give vent to their aggressive inclinations, In this connection
it behooves us to do whatever may be possible to encourage Titoism
among the satellites and to hinder the military-economic consolidation
and development of the Soviet sphere.

6. That we are at all times ready to negotiate earnestl, y and honestly
on any and all of the outstanding issues between East and West and.
will welcome sincere Soviet proposals for the settlement of these issues.

These are, of course, the policies which we are now pursuing. It is
desirable, however, that they be firmly and frequently restated as the
positive aspect of our relation to the Soviets and to the problems
created by Soviet ambitions and delusions.