NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


the outbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increas-
ing its own capabilities as those of the U.S. diminished. This could
change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated that our
maximum weakness had been reached, and that further passage of
time leading to the material strengthening of the relative position and
military posture of the United States would not work to Soviet
advantage.
   b. The Kremlin might undertake immediate and simultaneous
attack in all possible theatres of action.
   c. Such attack could be accompanied or immediately followed by
a direct attack upon the continent of North America, since a Soviet
attack upon United States territory as well as upon its armed forces
abroad is a Soviet capability.
   d. In view of the advantages of surprise and of the desirability for
an enemy of the United States to strike a serious blow at the North
American industrial potential, the possibility must be constantly
borne in mind that the Kremlin might now decide to initiate global
war by a direct surprise attack upon the territory of the United States
before taking the actions-referred to in a or b above.
   10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet
design; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the
present situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either
the U.S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assump-
tion of immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for
the United States would be full preparation at full speed. While not
ruling out the possibility that global war is imminent, it is not yet
a sufficient certainty to be the assumption on which U.S. action should
be based. The present question is one of the degree of preparation we
should undertake to improve our ability to meet any of the eventuali-
ties treated in this paper. Our efforts should be urgently directed
toward preventing global war from developing and toward increas-
ing our war capabilities.
Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces to
    Achieve Local Objectives Not Designed To Bring on Global War
    11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of satel-
lite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon
but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve correlated
action in other parts of the world. A danger of direct commitment of
Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is in progress
between the United States and a Soviet satellite. A successful repulse
of the North Korean invasion would not merely restore the status quo.
United States troops would be back, in force in South Korea, and a
build-up of military strength in certain of the non-communist areas
of the Far East would have taken place.


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