NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY1


ing them. Mr. Nitze pointed out that this raised two questions to which.
satisfactory answers have never been obtained: (a) How. does the
UN act as a sovereign entity and (b) where would the UN keep its
bombs and plants? The discussion then turned to the question Of
whether or not it was possible to stop technological processes or even
to slow them down. Mr. LeBaron pointed out that no one .could
predict the ends of technological progress fifty years ahead, although
he agreed with Dr. Smyth's general statement that there is "no fore-
seeable peacetime uses of atomic energ y".Mr. Nitze pointed out that
one suggestion was to declare a moratorium on atomic-progress and
Dr. Smyth added that it seemed to him to be a matter of foregoing
future possibilities temporarily in order to get control, and that this
idea had even more merit since the H-bomb entered 'the picture. He
agreed that scientific progress was na reality but said that' it was also
a reality that the Russiansare o n.the same globe with us, ,that we both
have these weapons and that ,wemustA;'find.some w'ayof living with
each other. Mr. LeBaron suggested that the question boiled down to
a decision as to where to expend one's ener'gies,, and Mr. Nitze took
the position that we can't abandOn either line.. On ,the ;oneý hand,
the
chances of coming to an agreement on this mafter are slim indeed
and extremely difficult to realize. On the otherhand, the fact that we
and the Russians are mutually building up greater and greater force
is n"ot necessarily a deterrent to war and may be a most dangerous
road. In our own case, there is the danger that such a course might
meanrthat we would lose most of our freedoms through th"egradual
creation of a garrisonstate, and he cOnCluded that we must con-
currently go. down both ,roads. Mr. Barnard agreed, said that he
thought that an* approach to the Russians on the package basis was
well worth trying, that international control of atomic energy alone
was not enough and probably at this stage could not even get con-
gressiontal support.
  F. With specific regard to the organization of -the study group's
paper, General.Landon and Mr. Lay pointed out that both-the Joint.
Chiefs and the President might require that our objectives be stated
more-clearlyin the paper, as the, former would constantly have to u'se
them as the basis for their strategic plans and the latter would need
something specific to approve.
  G. Dr. Smyyth's final comment was that the one thing h6 missed in
the paper was a gospel which lends itself to- preaching.::Mr. Nitze
said that tha4t was something we had in mind and it might be moreap-
proprilate in the ,forlm of a speech written for the President than as an
integ~ral part of te sudy


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